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COMMENTS
MANDATORY INDEMNIFICATION OF CORPORATE
OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS
by Margaret E. Barrett
Most state general corporation statutes permit a corporation to indemnify
its directors, officers, employees, and agents for expenses incurred in defend-
ing actions for personal liability arising from activities in their official
capacities.' New York was the first state to enact indemnification legisla-
tion.2 Its statutes furnished a limited right to indemnification, and permitted
a corporation to provide for indemnification in its bylaws, or charter.3
Delaware's original indemnification statute, enacted in 1943, 4 and copied by
many states, was repealed in 1967 and has been replaced with a statute
similar to the Model Code provision.5 All but two states now have enacted
indemnification provisions. 6 The indemnification statutes vary in content, but
can be classified into two categories, permissive or "enabling" statutes, which
give a corporation the power to indemnify its officers or directors under
certain circumstances, and mandatory or "right" statutes, which give the
officer or director an enforceable right to indemnification when statutory
standards of conduct are met. 7 Some statutes, known as exclusive statutes,
permit indemnification only as prescribed by the statute, while the more
common nonexclusive statutes acknowledge the right of the corporation
to indemnify in circumstances not expressly described in the statute.8 In a few
1. The Appendix lists the state indemnification statutes now in effect. There is no
general common law rule entitling directors and officers of a corporation to indemnifica-
tion. For a discussion of the treatment at common law of agreements to indemnify, see
G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, INDEMNIFYING THE CORPORATE ExECUrrvE 75-111 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as WASHINGTON & BISHOP]; H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS 800-04 (2d ed. 1970).
2. Law of April 2, 1941, ch. 209, § 1, [1941] N.Y. Laws 164th Sess. 813; Law of
April 14, 1941, ch. 350, § 1, [1941] N.Y. Laws 164th Sess. 1034 (repealed 1945).
3. Id.
4. Law of April 15, 1943, ch. 125, § 1, [1943] Del. Laws 422 (repealed 1967).
5. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. § 5 (2d ed. 1971). The indemnification
provision of the Model Business Corporation Act was revised in 1967. The committee
responsible for drafting the Model Act provisions consulted with the Delaware Corpora-
tion Revision Commission responsible for the 1967 Delaware revision. As a result, the
resulting Model Act § 4(a), now § 5, is almost identical to § 145 of the 1967 Delaware
General Corporation Act.
6. Idaho and New Hampshire have no indemnification statutes.
7. WASHINGTON & BISHOP 115. The Appendix lists the statutes with mandatory
provisions. Some statutes have both permissive and mandatory features. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 721-26 (McKinney 1963), as
amended, § 727 (McKinney Supp. 1974), and ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. §
5 (2d ed. 1971), after which many state statutes are patterned.
8. The right is generally considered to be limited by public policy. The Appendix
lists the statutes which are exclusive and those which are nonexclusive.
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exclusive type statutes indemnification is mandatory up to the limits of the
particular statute. 9
Most of the recently enacted statutes place more restrictions on the power
of a corporation to indemnify for expenses arising from defending derivative
suits than those arising from third-party actions, 10 a distinction many of the
early statutes did not make." The newer statutes also define more specifi-
cally the minimum standards of conduct which must be met before indemni-
fication may be awarded by a corporation or ordered by a court. Even
among the modern statutes, however, significant differences exist as to the
discretion given the corporation in its decision to indemnify. The indemnifi-
cation statutes of California 12 and New York' 3 are examples of restrictive
types, while the Delaware statute14 and the Model Act provisions,1" which
are almost identical, are among the most permissive.' 6 An analysis of the
mandatory provisions of state indemnification statutes which grant insiders a
statutory right to indemnification where certain conditions have been met is
necessary to reveal the possible hidden traps for both management and
shareholders. Of particular interest are court decisions interpreting and
applying the statutes.
The mandatory indemnification provisions of three states, New York,
California, and Delaware, will be compared in part I of this Comment.
These statutes were chosen as representative statutes and also because of the
large number of businesses incorporated in each of these states. These
modern statutes will be contrasted with the Texas statute, an example of the
old Delaware-type statute. In part II of this Comment problems of judicial
interpretation of important terms of the older and the newer versions of
indemnification statutes will be discussed. The suggestion that policies under-
lying federal securities law conflict with indemnification allowed under some
of the statutes will be considered in part III.
9. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 33-320(a) (1972); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW H§
721-26 (McKinney 1963), as amended, § 727 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
10. Under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1974), for example, a corporation may
indemnify against fines, judgments and settlement payments in addition to legal expenses
if the expenses arose from defense of a third-party suit. The rationale is that the director
or officer could have been acting in the best interests of his corporation when he
committed the offense. In a derivative suit, however, the corporation may not indemnify
the executive for settlement payments or legal expenses incurred in an unsuccessful
defense. To permit indemnification under such circumstances would tend to nullify the
effect of the derivative suit. See generally E. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL COR-
PORATION LAW: A COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS 98-104 (1972); Sebring, Recent Legis-
lative Changes in the Law of Indemnification of Directors, Officers and Others, 23 Bus.
LAW. 95 (1967).
11. See, e.g., the original Delaware statute, Law of April 15, 1943, ch. 125, § 1,
[1943] Del. Laws 422 (repealed 1967).
12. CAL. CORP. CODE § 830 (West Supp. 1975).
13. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW H8 721-26 (McKinney 1963), as amended, § 727
(McKinney Supp. 1974).
14. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1974).
15. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 5 (2d ed. 1971).
16. At least 25 states have enacted indemnification provisions substantially like the
Delaware and the Model Act provisions. See the Appendix.
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I. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
A. The Texas Statute
The Texas indemnification statute,17 patterned after the original Dela-
ware statute, authorizes a corporation to indemnify a director or officer
against expenses incurred in "any action, suit, or proceeding" in his official
capacity, except where he was "adjudged in such action, suit or proceeding
to be liable for negligence or misconduct in performance of duty."' 8 The
statute is permissive rather than mandatory, and is nonexclusive. It does not
distinguish between derivative suits and third-party actions, 19 or between
civil and criminal actions. Corporate employees and agents are not included.
In 1973 the Texas statute was amended to provide that a corporation may
purchase indemnification insurance on behalf of its officers, directors, em-
ployees, or agents, "whether or not the corporation would have the power to
indemnify [them] against such liability under the provisions of this Arti-
cle.",20
B. The New York, California, and Delaware Statutes
These three statutes are representative of the modem indemnification
statutes, and they are likely to serve as patterns for other states wishing to
amend their existing indemnification statutes. 21 An understanding of the
courts' interpretation and application of these statutes is, therefore, very
important. Few indemnification claims are actually litigated, except in states
where the court procedure is exclusive. 22 Indemnification of insiders23 by
corporations most frequently occurs under the authority of the permissive
sections. The typical statutory pattern is to allow some disinterested person
17. TEX. Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02(A)(16) (1955), as amended, (Supp.
1975).
18. Id.
19. The term "derivative suit" is used to mean a suit by a shareholder to enforce a
corporate cause of action, while the term "third-party suit" refers to actions other than
by or in the right of the corporation.
20. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.02(A)(16), as amended, (Supp. 1975). For a
discussion of indemnification insurance, see Knepper, Corporate Indemnification and
Liability Insurance for Corporation Officers and Directors, 25 Sw. L.J. 240 (1971).
21. Many states already have statutes patterned after the Delaware or the Model Act
provisions. See the Appendix.
22. California's court procedure is exclusive for claims arising from defending
derivative suits. The corporation may indemnify without a court proceeding when the
claim arises from defending a third-party suit. CAL. CORP. CODE § 830(f) (West Supp.
1975).
23. The term "insider" is used to represent those persons explicitly covered by each
indemnification statute. Under Delaware's statute, directors, officers, agents, and employ-
ees are included. The statute also covers directors and officers of other corporations who
serve at the request of the indemnifying corporation, and directors and officers of
subsidiary corporations. The New York statute covers only directors and officers, but
specifically reserves the rights to indemnification that employees and agents have under
common law agency principles. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 721 (McKinney 1963), and
comment thereto. In Sandfield v. Goldstein, 33 App. Div. 376, 308 N.Y.S.2d 25(1970), aff'd, 28 N.Y.2d 794, 270 N.E.2d 723, 321 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1971), a manager of
a corporation was denied mandatory reimbursemet under the statute by the corporation
for legal fees incurred in defending a stockholders' derivative action. The California
statute includes directors, officers, and employees.
1975]
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or group to make a determination that the insider has not breached his
fiduciary duty to the corporation. The disinterested group is usually com-
posed of the directors who are not involved in the litigation, the shareholders
of the corporation, or independent legal counsel.24
Under a Delaware-type provision the corporation's shareholders often
never learn of the reimbursement and never have the opportunity to contest
the payment. California and New York, however, give the court power to
require the corporation to notify shareholders that a claim for indemnifica-
tion has been instituted.25 Claims for mandatory indemnification usually
reach the courts only if a shift in corporate management has occurred and
the new management refuses to indemnify the director or officer. 26 When a
suit for mandatory indemnification is brought, clear, equitable statutory
standards are essential. The three mandatory indemnification provisions un-
der discussion differ principally in two areas: the degree of court discretion
allowed to deny or grant indemnification, considering all the circumstances
of the case, and the related statutory right to partial indemnification, when
a defense has been partially successful.
California's statute is the most restrictive of the three states under
consideration. Section 830(a) gives an insider a statutory right to indemnifi-
cation only where two conditions are met: "(1) the person sued is successful
in whole or in part, or the proceeding against him is settled with the approval
of the court, [and] (2) [t]he court finds that his conduct fairly and
equitably merits such indemnity."' 27 The indemnification granted is for rea-
sonable expenses incurred in the litigation, including attorney's fees.28 The
California statute also imposes the prerequisite of a court proceeding when
indemnification is sought for expenses arising from a derivative suit. 29 While
the court has discretion to refuse indemnification if the success was on a
technical basis,30 partial indemnification is possible under the statute to the
extent that the court deems it justified. The California statute is an exclusive
indemnification statute, so the corporation may not provide indemnification
in ways not prescribed by the statute.3 1 By interposing the court's discretion,
the statute enhances the protection of shareholders against the possibility that
24. Bishop argues that the "independent legal counsel" will not adequately protect
the interests of shareholders because corporate management will usually choose counsel
sympathetic to management. Bishop, Sittings Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in
the Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1080
(1968).
25. The New York statute requires the corporation to notify the shareholders of the
indemnification payments if indemnification is not ordered by a court. N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 726(c) (McKinney 1963). Bishop cites the General Motors' bylaw as the only
corporate bylaw of which he has knowledge that requires that the stockholders beinformed of indemnification payments. Bishop, supra note 24, at 1079-80.
26. When a state has a permissive statute, a corporation can make indemnification a
matter of contract with its executives, either by corporate charter or bylaw, or by a
separate agreement.
27. CAL. CORP. CODE § 830(a) (West Supp. 1975).
28. Id.
29. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 830(e), (f) (West Supp. 1975).
30. Examples of technical grounds for success are the running of the statute of
limitations and deficiency in an indictment.
31. CAL. CORP. CODE § 830(e) (West Supp. 1975).
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an executive who has not acted in the best interest of the company may
receive indemnification from corporate funds.32
New York's present indemnification provision, enacted in 1963, is exclu-
sive and contains both permissive and mandatory sections.3 3 It has been
described as "[an] example of a legislative effort to restrict indemnification
to insiders who deserve it. '' s4 Section 724 gives a statutory right to indemni-
fication where a director or officer is "wholly successful, on the merits or
otherwise, in the defense of a civil or criminal action. '3 5 Thus, a director or
officer who has breached a fiduciary duty to his corporation but who has
been completely successful on technical grounds is entitled to indemnifica-
tion and a court must grant it if sought. The rationale generally expressed
for such a provision is that a director or officer should not be forced to
incur the expense of a defense on the merits when a technical defense would
suffice.36 The director or officer who has been partially successful and whose
corporation refuses to indemnify him may seek court-ordered indemnifica-
tion under section 725,37 which gives the court power to order indemni-
fication under circumstances in which the corporation itself could have
indemnified.3 8 Thus, where only partial indemnification is sought, the New
York court has statutory standards of good faith conduct to use as a guide
and is not required to indemnify automatically those defendants who were
successful on technical grounds. New York's mandatory indemnification
provision differs from California's principally in that California gives the
court discretion in every case where mandatory indemnification is sought,
whereas New York courts have such discretion only when partial indemni-
fication is sought.39 Another significant difference between the two statutes
is that New York permits a corporation to modify the mandatory indemni-
fication by a provision in its corporate documents in effect when the cause
of action against the director or officer allegedly accrued,40 whereas Cali-
32. The California statute has been described as an attempt to prevent abuses to
which the corporate treasury might be vulnerable under a Delaware-type provision.
WASHINGTON & BISHOP 138. For further analysis of the California statute see Knepper,
supra note 20, at 243-44.
33. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW H9 721-26 (McKinney 1973), as amended, § 727
(McKinney Supp. 1974).
34. Bishop, supra note 24, at 1080 n.6. Other statutes mentioned by Bishop are CAL.
CORP. CODE § 830 (West Supp. 1975) and CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 33-320 (1972).
35. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 724(a) (McKinney 1963). This codifies prior New York
case law which interpreted the word "success" in the earlier New York statute to include
success due to a technical defense. See cases cited at note 70 infra and accompanying
text.
36. See, e.g., E. FOLK, supra note 10, at 100. This rationale presupposes that the
executive would have won on the merits. If the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to
the corporation, the California procedure is preferable insofar as shareholders' interests
are concerned because the court has discretion to deny the award if not deserved.
37. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 725 (McKinney 1963).
38. See id. §H 722, 723 detailing the circumstances under which a corporation may
indemnify. The permissive sections, 722 and 723, become mandatory when read in
conjunction with § 725.
39. An additional difference is that the New York statutes define more explicitly the
standards of conduct to be met for an award of indemnification, whereas in the
California court proceeding the standard in addition to success is simply that his conduct
"fairly and equitably merits such indemnity." Compare N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §H 722,
723 (McKinney 1963), with CAL. CORP. CODE § 830(a) (West Supp. 1975).
40. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 726(b)(2) (McKinney 1963). Since the New York
1975]
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fornia expressly disallows a corporation's attempt to modify the operation
of the statute.4 1
The Delaware Corporation Law, extensively revised in 1967, contains
permissive and mandatory provisions for indemnification. 42 Sections 145(a)
and (b) permit the corporation to indemnify in third-party actions when a
good.4aith standard is met43 and in derivative suits, under more restrictive
circumstances. 44 Section 145(c) supplies mandatory indemnification against
expenses (including attorneys' fees) "to the extent that the director, officer,
employee or agent of a corporation has been successful on the merits or
otherwise in defense of any action, suit, proceeding referred to in subsections
(a) or (b), or in defense of any claim, issue or matter therein. '45 This
grants an enforceable statutory right to indemnification in a broader range of
situations than the California or New York statutes. 46 Only the Delaware
statute gives an enforceable right to partial indemnification without a court's
determination that indemnification is merited under the circumstances of the
case, or that a requisite standard of conduct has been met. If the insider
meets the "success" criteria on any "claim, issue or matter" the court must
grant indemnification. 47
According to its drafters, Delaware's mandatory indemnification section
was enacted primarily to protect vindicated directors and officers from a
statute is exclusive, the corporation could not provide for indemnification beyond the
limits of the statute or in contravention of its terms. For further analysis of the New
York statute, see Knepper, supra note 20, at 244-46.
41. CAL. CORP. CODE § 830(e) (West Supp. 1975).
42. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1974). The Delaware indemnification provision
is nonexclusive. Id. § 145(f). For a discussion of what the nonexclusive provision was
intended to cover, see Bishop, supra note 24, at 1085; Folk, supra note 10, at 100-01. For
an interesting application of the nonexclusive provision, see text at notes 115-21 infra.
43. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1974).
44. Id. § 145(b).
45. Id. § 145(c).
46. However, Delaware's provisions do not contain the equivalent of New York's §
725, which gives the court the authority to order indemnification in circumstances where
the corporation could have indemnified but did not. In New York, an insider whose
corporation refuses to indemnify him when he has been unsuccessful can seek a court
determination that even though unsuccessful, he met the applicable standard of duty to
the corporation and thus is entitled to indemnification. Under the Delaware statute, the
corporation's finding would be final. In California it appears that the result would be
like that in New York.
Another difference among the statutes should be mentioned. As a result of New York's
§ 725, giving a court-enforceable right to indemnification where the corporation could
have indemnified but did not, it would be possible for an insider to receive indemnifica-
tion for the amount of fines and judgments, as well as for legal expenses, in a mandatory
proceeding. The Delaware and California mandatory statutes cover only expenses.
Ordinarily, legal expenses far exceed fines and judgments, so the difference will usually
not cause too much discrepancy.
47. The words "claim, issue or matter" leave some room for court interpretation.
Assume, for example, that a shareholders' derivative suit were brought against an officer
claiming $50,000 damages under one count and $50,000 on a separate count and one
count was dismissed. Presumably, the court would be required to award expenses for the
defense of the successful count, if mandatory indemnification were sought. If, however,
the complaint alleged $100,000 damages on a single theory or count but the jury awarded$50,000, the court might well find that the defense had not been successful on a single




refusal to indemnify them when an adverse shift in management occurs. 48
The statute, however, does not limit its application to the situation where a
shift in management has occurred. 49 The mandatory section suggested by
Professor Ernest L. Folk, III, the Reporter to the Delaware Corporation Law
Revision Commission, would have incorporated the restrictions and good
faith requirements of sections 145(a) and (b).50 This was rejected, and
section 145(c), as enacted, is considerably more favorable to management
than the version recommended by Professor Folk. Under section 145(c) an
insider who has been successful wholly or partially on a technical defense
may demand and receive indemnification, including legal fees, notwithstand-
ing the standards of conduct in (a) and (b) that must be met if the
corporation chooses to indemnify. An underlying policy for the enactment of
an indemnification provision favorable to management was the desire to
attract incorporators for the State of Delaware.51
48. See, e.g., Sebring, supra note 10, at 100; cf. Mooney v. Willys-Overland Motors,
Inc., 204 F.2d 888, 898 (3d Cir. 1953); Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Automatic Steel
Prods., Inc., 39 Del. Ch. 371, 379, 164 A.2d 437, 441-42 (1960). Legislative background
of the reasons for the enactment of the Delaware mandatory provision is limited. A 1963
Delaware statute authorized the secretary of state to spend $25,000 to study revisions in
the Delaware Corporation Law. Law of December 31, 1963, ch. 218, [19631 54 Del.
Laws 724. The secretary of state formed the Delaware Corporation Law Revision
Commission to study and formulate proposed revisions. The Commission chose a
reporter, Ernest L. Folk, III, whose published report contains the only detailed comments
on the reasons for enacting the mandatory provision. E. FOLK, REVIEW OF THE
DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW (1968). For a detailed account of the process of drafting
and the composition and background of the members of the revision committee, see
Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. PA.
L. REV. 861 (1961). The Delaware Law Revision Commission's final recommendation
was passed unanimously by the legislature, and no legislative history or official explana-
tion was published. Id. at 869-70. Several members of the Revision Commission pub-
lished articles or books explaining the new law, but the mandatory section is explained
by most of these drafters simply as giving vindicated directors and officers an enforcea-
ble right to indemnification in the event of a shift in management. See, e.g., S. ARSHT &
W. STAPLETON, ANALYSIS OF THE NEW DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW (1967); E. FOLK,
THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW: A COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS (1972);
Arsht & Stapleton, Delaware's New General Corporation Law: Substantive Changes, 23
Bus. LAW. 75 (1967); Canby, Delaware's New Corporation Law, 39 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 380
(1968).
49. Professor Folk indicated that the provision was desirable where "a change of
management refuses to indemnify old management personnel in situations where indem-
nification would be proper; or if a by-law is unduly and needlessly restrictive on
indemnity . . . or where management hesitates to indemnify voluntarily for some or no
reason." E. FOLK, REVIEW OF THE DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW 91-92 (1968).
50. Professor Folk suggested the following provision: "A director or officer or
employee who has been wholly successful on the merits or otherwise, in defense of any
action, suit, or proceeding, or in defense of any claim, issue or matter therein, shall be
entitled to indemnification as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section." Id. at
96 (emphasis added). Subsections (a) and (b) contained the standards of conduct for
permissive indemnification. Under Professor Folk's proposed statute, mandatory indemni-
fication would not be available to a director or officer who had not met those standards.
Folk also suggested that if a right to indemnification were provided for the successful
executive, "it could easily be provided further that the court may also allocate indemnifia-
ble expenses and items when a director is adjudicated liable as to some but not all claims
to the extent that the court deems fair and equitable." Id. at 88 (emphasis added).
Professor Folk's final draft did not give the court such discretion.
51. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663 (1974); Comment, supra note 48. In the same bill that authorized expenditures for a
revision study of the corporation statutes, Delaware's legislature declared it to be the
public policy of the state "to maintain a favorable business climate and to encourage
corporations to make Delaware their domicile." Law of Dec. 31, 1963, ch. 218, [1963]
1975]
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II. PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION
A. Interpreting the Old Statutes
One reason for the enactment of the new Delaware statute was that the
original Delaware statute failed to resolve several important issues. 52 For
example, the old statute was silent as to whether it was exclusive or
nonexclusive, that is, whether the corporation had the power to indemnify in
situations not expressly covered by the statute. Also, the statute did not
specify whether indemnification was permitted in all forms of actions against
directors, such as criminal proceedings or derivative suits. 3 As the Delaware
statute served as a prototype for so many other state indemnification
statutes,5 4 these problems still persist in many jurisdictions.
The present Texas indemnification statute55 is almost identical to the
original Delaware statute, except for a 1973 amendment to the Texas Act
which permits a corporation to purchase indemnification insurance for its
directors, officers, and certain other persons, even though the corporation
itself may not be authorized by the statute to indemnify the executive.56
Although the Texas Bar Committee responsible for drafting revisions to the
Texas Business Corporation Act 7 considered an extensive revision of the
Texas indemnification statute in 1973, the insurance amendment was the
only new provision submitted to the legislature. The statute under considera-
tion5" was similar to the current Delaware-Model Act provision. Due to
objections from some members of the Committee as to the breadth of
situations where indemnification would be authorized, the Committee did not
report the entire bill to the legislature for approval,' but revision of the
statute is almost certain to be considered again soon.60 Because of the
uncertainty as to the scope of the Texas statute as it stands, with the
exception of the express authorization for insurance, many corporations will
54 Del. Laws 724. Professor Folk's report to the Commission described a mandatory
indemnification section as "a feature by which the Delaware Statute would gain added
attractiveness." E. FOLK, supra note 49, at 91.
52. See Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Dorsey Corp., 40 Del. Ch. 343, 182 A.2d 647,
655-56 (1962); WASHINGTON & BISHOP 116-36; Bishop, supra note 24, at 1081.
53. See WASHINGTON & BISHOP 116-36 for a discussion of the questions unresolved
by the old Delaware statute. See also Schwarz v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 198
Misc. 1046, 102 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1951), aff'd, 279 App. Div. 996, 112 N.Y.S.2d
146 (1952), alf'd, 305 N.Y. 395, 113 N.E.2d 533 (1953), discussed infra notes 108-11
and accompanying text.
54. See Appendix.
55. Tax. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 2.02(A)(16) (1955), as amended, (Supp. 1975).
56. Id. The insurance provision is similar to a provision in the current Model Act
and Delaware codes. Many writers have questioned the propriety of permitting a
corporation to use its funds to buy insurance against situations in which it could not
indemnify directly. See note 137 inlra.
57. Committee on Revision of Corporation Law of the State Bar Section on
Corporation, Banking and Business Law.
58. S.B. 202, § 4, 63d Legis., Reg. Sess. (1973).
59. See Lebowitz, Recent Developments in Texas Corporation Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 641,
748 and nn.796-98 (1974).
60. According to Lebowitz, supra note 59, the Committee decided not to submit a
proposed indemnification statute to the legislature until 1977.
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find that indemnification insurance is the most desirable method of handling
the problem of indemnification in Texas. 61
B. Interpreting the Modern Statutes
In interpreting its modern indemnification statute, the Delaware superior
court recently reached a result which suggests that the Model Act-Delaware
type statutes should be drafted more carefully. 62 Among the important
problems of interpretation of the Delaware-type statute are the problems of
interpreting the meaning of "successful defense," and the related issue of the
proper treatment of a suit for indemnification by a director or officer who
has pleaded nolo contendere6 3 to the charges against him.
Successful Defense. Under each of the three modern statutes discussed
herein, a successful defense is a prerequisite to mandatory indemnification. 4
Under the Delaware statute the standard for indemnification as of right is
"successful on the merits or otherwise."6 5 In New York, it is "wholly
successful, on the merits or otherwise,"'66 while in California, the standard is
"successful in whole or in part. '' 67 Since indemnification may be obtained by
showing a "successful defense" to a suit, the meaning of the term is critical in
Delaware and New York. The courts in California have discretion to refuse
the award even where a defense was successful if they find from all the
circumstances of a case that indemnification is not merited.
The problem of interpreting the term "successful defense" arose originally
in New York under its older indemnification statute.68 The New York courts
treated the statutory term "successful" in a literal fashion. 69 In several cases
under the old statute, directors were awarded indemnification where a suit
was dismissed for technical reasons, such as the running of the statute of
limitations. 70 The present New York statute expressly provides that the
61. To date, no Texas cases have interpreted the Texas indemnification provision.
For a discussion of indemnification insurance, see Knepper, supra note 20; Lebowitz,
supra note 59, at 749-52.
62. See notes 87-96 infra and accompanying text.
63. Nolo contendere is a plea in a criminal action by which the defendant does not
contest the charge and thereby may be sentenced as if he had been found guilty.
64. One exception is New York's § 725, which when considered in conjunction with
§§ 722 and 723 allows a court to order indemnification where the director or officer has
not been successful, but nevertheless has met the good faith standards of conduct toward
his corporation. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 725 (McKinney 1963).
65. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (1974).
66. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 724 (McKinney 1963).
67. CAL. CORP. CODE § 830(a) (West Supp. 1975). Settlement with court approval
is an alternative to success.
68. The standard for indemnification under the predecessor of the present New York
statute was "successful prosecution or defense." Law of April 14, 1941, ch. 350, § 1,
[1941] N.Y. Laws 164th Sess. 1034, 1035 (repealed 1945).
69. WASHINGTON & BISHOP 151.
70. See, e.g., Austrian v. Williams, 120 F. Supp. 900, 904-06 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), rev'd
in part on other grounds, 216 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 953
(1955); Doman v. Humphrey, 278 App. Div. 1010, 106 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1951); Marco
v. Sachs, 201 Misc. 928, 932, 106 N.Y.S.2d 522, 527 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Tichner v.
Andrews, 193 Misc. 1059, 85 N.Y.S.2d 760 (Sup. Ct.), appeal dismissed, 275 App. Div.
749, 90 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1949). But see Diamond v. Diamond, 307 N.Y. 263, 120 N.E.2d
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success may be on the merits or otherwise, 71 which would include technical
defenses.
Since the enactment in Delaware of the mandatory provision, the question
of what constitutes a "successful" defense has been presented in three
important cases. In Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson 72 the
claimants seeking indemnification had been convicted on five counts of
violating the federal securities laws.73  In the indictment on count one,
charging conspiracy to violate federal securities laws, several elements were
included, but at the conclusion of the Government's case, the 1Ob-5 fraud
element 74 was removed by the court from that count. 75 The jury returned
guilty verdicts for all three directors under the conspiracy count with its
remaining elements. 70 The directors sought indemnification under section
145(c) of the Delaware law, contending that the removal of the 1Ob-5 fraud
element of count one constituted success. 77 The Delaware superior court
denied indemnification, finding it difficult to understand the defendants'
claim of success, when they had been charged with and convicted of
conspiracy on count one.7 8 The court described section 145 as having been
enacted "to give vindicated directors and officers involved in corporate
affairs a judicially enforceable right to indemnification. It would be anoma-
lous, indeed, and diametrically opposed to the spirit and purpose of the
statute and sound public policy to extend the benefits of indemnification to
these defendants under the facts and circumstances of this case."'7 9 The court
thus limited the construction which could be given to the "claim, issue, or
matter"80 element of the Delaware partial indemnification statute.
In Galdi v. Berg"' a defendant in a stockholders' derivative suit in federal
district court in Delaware sought indemnification under section 145(c) when
819 (1954), where a divided court denied indemnification as of right to the defendant
director where the suit against him was dismissed because the plaintiff's own misconduct
estopped her from bringing suit. In People v. Uran Mining Corp., 13 App. Div. 2d 419,
216 N.Y.S.2d 985 (1961), where a lawsuit against the claimant had been dismissed, the
court denied the award of indemnification because there was no finding of the applicant's
good faith.
71. See N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 724 (McKinney 1963), and comment thereto.
72. 264 A.2d 358 (Del. Super. Ct. 1970).
73. Count one charged all claimants with conspiracy to violate federal securities
laws; the specific acts charged were perjury, subornation of perjury, filing false state-
ments with the SEC, obstruction of justice, and fraud upon the corporate shareholders in
violation of SEC rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975). Count two charged claimant
Wolfson and count three charged claimant Gerbert with perjury before the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Counts four and five charged Wolfson, Gerbert, and Staub with
filing false annual reports for 1962 and 1963 with the SEC and the New York Stock
Exchange. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138 (Del. Super. Ct.
1974).
74. SEC rule lOb-5 makes it a federal offense to make statements, omissions, or to
engage in any course of conduct which operates on persons as a fraud or deceit in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975).
75. 264 A.2d at 359.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 360.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (Supp. 1974).
81. 359 F. Supp. 698 (D. Del. 1973).
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the derivative claim against him was dismissed without prejudice because the
company was actively pursuing the claim against the defendant in another
proceeding.8 2 The other suit had not been resolved, and the court found it
"clear that the dismissal of count five in the action decided nothing with
respect to the allegations of wrongdoing by Power or any other defendant."8 3
Quoting Professor Folk's statement that the purpose of the statute was to
give vindicated directors the right to indemnification, 84 the court said
dismissal of the count did not vindicate the defendant; rather, the charge was
"simply erased."85 Indemnification in such situations would thus not fall
within the underlying purpose of section 145, as construed in the Wolfson
case. 86 The Galdi court thus refused to extend "success on the merits or
otherwise" to include a dismissal without prejudice where the identical cause
of action was apparently being vigorously pursued by the same parties in
another proceeding.
In 1974 an indemnification suit brought by four persons against Merritt-
Chapman & Scott, three of whom were claimants in the earlier Wolfson
case, 87 reached the Delaware superior court.8  The guilty verdicts in the
first suit had been reversed on appeal,8 9 and in two retrials, the juries had
failed to agree on a verdict. 90 Following the second retrial, Wolfson pleaded
nolo contendere to count five, and the other four counts against him were
dropped.91 He received a fine of ten thousand dollars and a suspended
sentence of eighteen months.92 Defendant Gerbert agreed not to appeal his
conviction on count three, and the other charges against him were dropped.
He received a fine of two thousand dollars and a suspended sentence of
eighteen months.93
Wolfson and Gerbert sought indemnification for the expenses incurred in
defending the dropped counts under section 145(c). 94 Merritt-Chapman &
Scott argued that the statute and sound public policy permit indemnification
only where the person has been vindicated, not where some of the charges
were dropped for practical reasons. 95 The court, however, granted indemni-
fication for the four counts which were dropped, stating: "Success is
vindication. In a criminal action, any result other than conviction must be
82. Id.
83. Id. at 701.
84. E. FOLK, supra note 10, at 98.
85. 359 F. Supp. at 702.
86. Id. The indemnification claim was dismissed without prejudice pending the
outcome of the other litigation.
87. 264 A.2d 358 (Del. Super. Ct. 1970).
88. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138 (Del. Super. Ct.
1974).
89. United States v. Wolfson, 437 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1970).
90. 321 A.2d at 140.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. Charges against the other two claimants in the case had also been dropeed as
a part of the agreement.
94. Id.
95. id. at 141.
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considered success. Going beyond the result . . . is neither authorized by
subsection (c) nor consistent with the presumption of innocence."96 The
Delaware court thus interpreted the success standard to include any result
other than conviction. This result constituted a broad extension of the
meaning of "success" and a seeming departure from the Wolfson and Galdi
decisions.
An alternate approach to the "success" question would have been a
restrictive interpretation of the term supported by the reference to vindica-
tion in earlier Delaware cases, 97 Professor Folk's report,9s and the published
explanations of the Revision Committee members.99 The Delaware superior
court, however, typically does not interpret the state's corporation laws in a
manner unfavorable or restrictive to management.'0 0 The court gave lip
service to the legislative history of the section by equating success with
vindication,' 0 ' but 'this interpretation of vindication would only seem to
distort the ordinary meaning of the word.' 02 The statute clearly authorizes
indemnification for technical defenses which do not fit within the vindication
category, so it is arguable that the requirement of vindication should not be
engrafted onto the statutory criteria of "success." Unfortunately, the statute
does not distinguish between defenses based on the running of the statute of
limitations, which the drafters intended to cover, 03 and dismissals less
deserving of indemnification.10 4
Nolo Contendere Pleas. Among the problems involved in interpreting "suc-
cessful defense" is determining the appropriate treatment of a plea of nolo
contendere upon which a suit demanding indemnification as of right is based.
The courts and commentators are not in full accord as to the effect of a nolo
contendere plea on indemnification rights ;1°5 however, two separate issues
generally arise: (1) the effect of a nolo contendere plea on the right to
indemnification for the count on which the plea is entered, and (2) the
effect of an agreement in a plea bargaining context whereby the defendant
pleads nolo contendere to some counts and others are dropped. The permis-
sive sections of the Delaware and New York statutes explicitly provide that a
plea of nolo contendere is not presumptive evidence of an adjudication of
96. Id.
97. Mooney v. Willys-Overland Motors, Inc., 204 F.2d 888, 898 (3d Cir. 1953);
Essential Enterprises Corp. v. Automatic Steel Prods., Inc., 39 Del. Ch. 371, 164 A.2d
437, 441-42 (Del. Ch. 1960).
98. E. FOLK, supra note 10, at 85, 89, 96 n.15.
99. See, e.g., articles cited supra note 48.
100. See Cary, supra note 51.
101. 321 A.2d at 141.
102. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE (College ed.
1962) defines "vindicate" thus: "(1) to clear from criticism, censure, suspicion, etc.;
uphold by evidence or argument."
103. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
104. See note 70 supra.




misconduct.10 6 However, the mandatory provisions are silent as to the effect
of a nolo contendere plea. The California statute does not mention the effect
of a nolo contendere plea on a suit for indemnification.' 07
Count on Which ,the Plea is Entered. The question of the effect of a nolo
contendere plea on a claim for mandatory indemnification arose under a
former New York statute in Schwarz v. General Aniline & Film Corp.10 8
Schwarz, a director who had pleaded nolo contendere to a criminal antitrust
prosecution under the Clayton Act, sought indemnification for the expenses
of his defense. 10 9 The court denied indemnification, finding the nolo con-
tendere plea to be "an adjudication that petitioner was liable for 'misconduct
in the performance of his duties' within the meaning of section 64 . . .-.
The New York court of appeals, in a 4-3 decision, affirmed the denial of
indemnification on the ground that the statute was not intended to cover
criminal proceedings."' Under the present New York statute, a defendant
who has pleaded nolo contendere would not meet the "wholly successful"
standard of mandatory section 724.112 If his corporation refused to indemni-
fy him, he could seek a court order for indemnification under section 725,
which empowers the court to order indemnification to the extent the
corporation could have granted it.113 In a third-party context the statute
explicitly states that a nolo contendere plea does not in itself create a
presumption that the applicable standards of conduct were not met. 1 4
Therefore, the New York court could examine the underlying facts in any
mandatory indemnification proceedings involving a plea of nolo contendere.
In Delaware the question of a nolo contendere plea was raised in Merritt-
106. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 723(b)(McKinney 1963). In two cases decided without reference to indemnification statutes,
pleas of nolo contendere by defendants charged in criminal antitrust proceedings were
found to have benefited the corporation, thereby providing consideration for the agree-
ment of the corporation to indemnify the directors. Koster v. Warren, 176 F. Supp. 459
(N.D. Cal. 1959), alf'd, 297 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1961); Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1942), affd, 267 App. Div. 890, 47
N.Y.S.2d 589 (1944). In Simon v. Socony-Vacuum, although the directors' actions had
been held illegal, the court found that the directors had "acted honestly and reasonably
and for what they believed to be the best interests of the company." 38 N.Y.S.2d at 273.
In Koster v. Warren, however, the executives received fines of $75,000 and $7500
respectively and each received a year's suspended prison sentence. Thus, the indemnifica-
tion award was made without reference to the executives' conduct. Bishop suggests that
the nonexclusive provision of the Delaware statute, § 145(e), was retained to cover the
possibility that the officer or director could provide consideration for an agreement to
indemnify,, as was done in these cases. Bishop, supra note 24, at 1085 n.26.
107. CAL. CORP. CODE § 830 (West Supp. 1975).
108. 198 Misc. 1046, 102 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1951), a! 'd, 279 App. Div. 996,
112 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1952), affd, 305 N.Y. 395, 113 N.E.2d 533 (1953).
109. 102 N.Y.S.2d at 326.
110. Id.
111. 305 N.Y. 395, 113 N.E.2d 533 (1953). The dissenting judge in Schwarz argued
that the statute was intended to cover criminal proceedings, and that further, a nolo
contendere plea was not an adjudication of liability, but a settlement or compromise
between the state and the defendant. Id. at 541-42.
112. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 724 (McKinney 1963).
113. Id. § 725.
114. Id. § 723.
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson. 115 In addition to seeking indemnifica-
tion for the counts which had been dropped, Wolfson and Gerbert sought
indemnification for expenses incurred in defense of the unsuccessful counts,
contending that a bylaw of the corporation effectively made mandatory the
permissive indemnification in section 145(a)." 61 The pertinent bylaw pro-
vided that a director or officer "shall be indemnified . . .except in relation
to matters as to which he shall finally be adjudged in such action, suit or
proceeding. . . to have been derelict in the performance of his duty as such
director or officer.' 17 The court recognized a right of indemnification that
may exist apart from the statute under section 145(f), the "nonexclusive"
provision, and treated the bylaw as granting such a right apart from the
statute." 8 However, acknowledging that "[a]lthough a plea of nolo con-
tendere may not be used as an admission in another action, upon acceptance
by the court and imposition of sentence there is a judgment of conviction
against the defendant," the court held that the "[c]onviction of these
offenses" established that the directors had been adjudged derelict in the
performance of their duties, and, thus, under the corporation's bylaw they
were not entitled to indemnification." 19 Under section 145(a), which au-
thorizes the corporation to indemnify, a nolo contendere plea is not presump-
tive evidence of breach of duty. 120 By treating the bylaw as independent of
the statute the court avoided the necessity of an inquiry of whether the
defendant had breached a duty to the corporation. The court said the bylaw,
unlike the statute, did not require an inquiry into the circumstances behind
the judgment, as the bylaw's standard was adjudication of misconduct. 121
The position of the dissent in Schwarz'22 seems much more sustainable
than the Delaware superior court's, since a nolo contendere plea is not an
admission of guilt for purposes other than the criminal prosecution itself, and
the indemnification proceeding is a collateral proceeding. 123 A nolo contend-
ere plea might not automatically satisfy a statutory requirement of success,
but the holding in Wolfson dealt with a bylaw standard of adjudication of
misconduct, rather than a statutory requirement of success. To sustain a
finding of misconduct, an inquiry into the circumstances which prompted the
plea of nolo contendere is necessary, since factors other than guilt may have
been the motivation.1 24 The Delaware statute requires such an inquiry
115. 321 A.2d 138 (Del. Super. Ct. 1974), discussed supra at notes 72-80 and
accompanying text. This was the second Wolfson case.
116. Id. at 142.
117. Id. Since the bylaw was worded similarly to the former indemnification statute,
in effect when the bylaw was adopted, the bylaw came closer to making mandatory the
permissive indemnification of that section, but did not do so as to section 145, the court
said. The former statute was Law of April 15, 1943, ch. 125, § 1, [1943] Del. Laws 422
(repealed 1967).
118. 321 A.2d at 143.
119. Id.
120. See note 106 supra.
121. 321 A.2d at 142.
122. See note 111 supra.




under the permissive sections; 1 25 common law principles should compel a
similar result without the statute. In Delaware, as a result of Wolfson, the net
result of a nolo contendere plea is that the corporation in a permissive
indemnification proceeding may look at the circumstances behind the plea,
but a court in a mandatory proceeding may not. The ultimate effect in
Delaware may be that the most extensive use of the mandatory section will
be by corporations, not in court proceedings. By noting that the success
standard of subsection (c) has been met, such as by dismissal of some
charges, a corporation could avoid making the determination as to whether
the fiduciary standard of (a) and (b) had been satisfied.1 26 Such a use
completely thwarts the protective measures set up in the permissive sec-
tions. 127 The California indemnification proceeding provides for an inquiry
into the underlying circumstances in every case of indemnification, either by
the court, or, in third-party suits, by the corporation.'12 It is questionable
what effect a nolo contendere plea would have under the California statute,
where the standard is success in whole or in part or settlement with court
approval.' 29 The court could conceivably treat a nolo contendere plea as a
settlement with court approval, since the court is not required to accept a
plea of nolo contendere.
The Plea Bargaining Context. Different considerations are involved when
indemnification is sought for those counts which have been dropped as part
of an agreement with the prosecution. In the second Wolison case," 3° a nolo
contendere plea to one count was entered following an agreement with the
prosecution by which the other four counts were dropped.131 On the four
counts which were dropped, the Delaware court found itself bound by the
125. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1974).
126. The corporation could reason that it was required to indemnify by the mandato-
ry section. Interview with Alan Bromberg, Professor of Law at Southern Methodist
University, in Dallas, Texas, Oct. 31, 1974.
127. It appears at first glance that in Delaware, only the court has the power, and
moreover is required, to indemnify where good faith standards are not met but some
charges have been dropped; a corporate charter or bylaw that agreed to indemnify in a
nolo contendere plea bargaining situation could not be permitted under section 145(a)
unless the fiduciary standard had been met. However, the Wolfson court recognized that
a right to indemnification could exist apart from the statute. It can be argued that if the
court can grant indemnification under a given set of circumstances, such indemnification
is not beyond the limits of public policy, and could be written into the corporate charter
under the authority of the nonexclusive provision in § 145(f). The Delaware court in
Wolfson discovered no public policy of the state which would prohibit such a result.
Furthermore, as indicated earlier, the corporation, by taking notice that a court would be
required to indemnify under the circumstances, could avoid making its determination that
a good faith standard of conduct had been met. If the court could award indemnification,
it should not be without the bounds of public policy for the corporation to voluntarily
indemnify under the same circumstances. However, the corporation would probably
construe the success standard much more loosely than would a court. The corporation
might ask its legal counsel, or the legal counsel of the person seeking indemnification, to
stipulate that he had been successful.
128. CAL. CORP. CODE § 830 (West Supp. 1975).
129. Id. § 830(a).
130. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138 (Del. Super. Ct.
1974).
131. Id. at 140.
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statutory criteria of success on "any claim, issue, or matter,"'u 2 and held
that success had to be inferred where charges were dismissed. The Delaware
court's holding seems consistent with the statutory treatment of technical
defenses. Under the Delaware statute, a successful technical defense to a




and dropped counts in this context are similar to defenses based on the bar
of the statute of limitations, or other technical defenses. The New York and
California partial indemnification provisions seem preferable to Delaware's
in this respect because under the New York and California statutes a court
faced with the Wolfson fact situation could inquire into the merits of the
defendant's claim.' 34
III. FEDERAL POLICY LIMITS ON MANDATORY INDEMNIFICATION
The effect of indemnification against legal expenses of an unsuccessful
defense on the interests of the shareholders of a corporation is a question of
state corporation law. However, the policies embodied in federal securities
law may conflict with the indemnification permitted by state corporation
law."35 The SEC's rule 460136 indicates disapproval of indemnification of
expenses incurred in unsuccessful defenses. Statutes which authorize corpora-
tions to purchase indemnification insurance for executives, to cover situations
which the corporation would not be permitted to indemnify directly, have
been heavily criticized as undermining the policy of the federal statutes. 137
Mandatory indemnification as authorized in the Delaware statute and as
awarded in Wolfson"as may also conflict with such policies.
Since only expenses are reimbursable under section 145(c), the problem
of reimbursement of fines incurred by the insider is not squarely presented
by the Delaware mandatory indemnification statute.139 It can be argued that
132. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (1974).
133. Id.
134. One possible treatment of the nolo contendere plea is Judge Fuld's idea that such
a plea is a settlement agreement with the state, rather than a conviction. The dropped
counts could then be treated as part of the settlement agreement. However, this approach
would probably not change the result in either New York, California, or Delaware. In
California, settlement with court approval, plus a finding that indemnification is merited,
entitles one to indemnification. In New York indemnification is possible following
settlement of a suit if the requisite standards of conduct have been met. But in Delaware
the mandatory indemnification section does not refer to settlement as a circumstance
under which indemnification can be obtained.
135. WASHINGTON & BISHOP 228-48; Note, Indemnification of the Corporate Official
for Fines and Expenses Resulting from Criminal Antitrust Litigation, 50 GEo. L.J. 566
(1962); Note, Indemnification of Directors: The Problems Posed by Federal Securities
and Antitrust Legislation, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1403 (1963).
136. See note 144 and accompanying text.
137. Bishop, supra note 24; Bishop, New Problems in Indemnifying and Insuring
Directors: Protection Against Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1972 DUKE
L.J. 1153; Kroll, Some Reflections on Indemnification Provisions and S.E.C. Liability
Insurance in the Light of Barchris and Globus, 24 Bus. LAw. 681 (1969); Note, Liability
Insurance for Corporate Executives, 80 HARv. L. REV. 648 (1967).
138. See notes 87-96 supra and accompanying text.
139. For a discussion of the problems involved in reimbursement of fines, see Note,
Indemnification of Directors: The Problems Posed by Federal Securities and Antitrust
Legislation, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1403 (1963).
[Vol. 29
COMMENTS
the federal statutory policy is not thwarted by the reimbursement of legal
expenses alone. 140 Even where liability was incurred under a statute whose
policy is deterrence,' 4 ' disallowing reimbursement of legal expenses may not
be an appropriate way to enforce compliance with the law. A penalty or fine
is assessed in proportion to the severity of the offense. Forcing the insider to
bear his own legal expenses increases the penalty, not in proportion to
culpability, but in relation to the quality of the defense and the difficulty of
defending against the charge. 142 It can also be argued that the ends of
criminal justice are served when a person vigorously defends a charge
leveled against him. The arguments supporting denial of indemnification of
expenses of unsuccessful litigation are the additional deterrence provided and
the reality that legal expenses often far exceed the fines levied, so that
indemnification would take most of the "sting" from a conviction.
143
Where the defense is successful, certainly no federal policy is thwarted by
reimbursement of expenses. If expenses for an unsuccessful defense are not
to be reimbursed because clearly defined federal policy is undermined
thereby, then -the definition of success assumes great importance. The Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission may not agree with the type of definition of
success the Delaware courts have given the partial indemnification statute.
The Commission has taken the position -that it is against public policy to
indemnify a director or officer against "liabilities incurred" in connection
with the issuance of a prospectus under the Securities Act of 1933. Under
the SEC's rule 460,144 a condition to acceleration under section 8(a) 1 4 is
that claims to indemnification arising out of the issuance of a prospectus
must be waived, or a printed statement must appear on the registration
statement that claims for indemnification will be submitted to a court for
approval.' 40 However, the rule does not clearly prohibit indemnification
140. Note, supra note 139, at 1411-12; Note, supra note 137, at 660-61; cf. Commis-
sioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966), where the Supreme Court held that legal expenses
incurred in the unsuccessful defense of a criminal securities charge were deductible as
ordinary and necessary business expenses for federal income tax purposes. The Court
said that no public policy is violated when a person hires a lawyer to defend against a
criminal charge, and that deductions for legal expenses would be permitted unless
allowance of the deduction frustrated some sharply defined public policy.
141. Section 11 of the Securities Act was intended to deter negligence in the
preparation of registration statements. See 3 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1831
(1961). If one of the purposes of the statute is compensation to the plaintiff, the
argument for indemnification becomes stronger. Reimbursement for liability for non-
willful violations of rule lOb-5, for example, should not offend public policy. See Bishop,
New Problems in Indemnifying and Insuring Directors: Protection Against Liability
Under the Federal Securities Laws, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1165.
142. Note, supra note 139, at 1411-12.
143. In the Wolfson case the fines incurred by Wolfson and Gerbert were $10,000
and $2,000, respectively. The legal fees charged were $250,000 per trial, and there had
been three trials. The law firm attributed 10% of its fee to the defense of the
unsuccessful counts. 321 A.2d at 143.
144. 17 C.F.R. § 230.460, note (a) (1975).
145. Acceleration is a discretionary process whereby the SEC can allow amendments
to a registration statement to become effective before expiration of the normal twenty-
day waiting period. It is essential that acceleration of the price amendment be allowed
because the price must be listed in the statement and it is almost impossible to set it
twenty days before sale. See 1 L. Loss, supra note 141, at 277.
146. 17 C.F.R. § 230.460, note (a) (1975).
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against expenses. The rule does except from its prohibition "payment by the
registrant of expenses incurred or paid by a director, officer or controlling
person of the registrant in the successful defense of any action, suit or
proceeding," thus seeming to indicate SEC disapproval of reimbursement of
legal expenses in an unsuccessful defense. 147 The SEC's approval of indem-
nification for expenses in a "successful defense of any action" may not
extend to partial indemnification or indemnification for expenses where
success was based on technical grounds. 148 The SEC's position, however, is
inconsistent to the extent that it permits indemnification insurance to be
purchased by the corporation. 149
The first case declaring an indemnification agreement invalid due to a
conflict with federal securities laws was Globus v. Law Research Service,
Inc.150 The trial judge in this case struck down the jury's award of indemnifi-
cation because enforcement of an indemnification agreement between an
issuer and an underwriter, where the underwriter had been found guilty
of misconduct, would have violated the public policy embodied in the fed-
eral securities legislation.' 51 Both the district court and the Second Cir-
cuit limited their holdings, however, to the situation where the underwriter
had been found guilty of misconduct involving omissions, false and mis-
leading statements, and wanton indifference to its obligations and the
rights of others. The indemnification agreement struck down provided for
reimbursement of legal expenses as well as for other liabilities,' 5' but
neither the district court nor the Second Circuit mentioned the possibility of
allowing reimbursement of legal expenses; the entire agreement was held
unenforceable.
The possibility seems remote that a statute permitting indemnification for
partial success or success on technical grounds will be held by a court -to be
violative of policies of federal securities law. First, Globus struck down an
indemnification agreement because the indemnitee was guilty of gross negli-
gence,'5 3 and no case has yet extended that holding to the situation of a
merely negligent violation of the securities laws. Second, since reimburse-
ment of legal fees of a successful defendant would not thwart any federal
policy,' 54 striking down an indemnification statute such as Delaware's would
involve quibbling over the definition of success, a fairly refined distinction.
As noted earlier,' 55 rule 460 is not clear on this point, so no definitive policy
of the Securities and Exchange Commission exists at present on the subject.
147. Id.
148. WASHINGTON & BISHOP 238; Note, supra note 139, at 1427.
149. Kroll, supra note 137, at 689, suggests that the SEC's position on insurance
reflects a balancing consideration between the need to compensate the victim and the
need to deter.
150. 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
151. 287 F. Supp. at 199.
152. 418 F.2d at 1287 n.14.
153. See text accompanying notes 151-52 supra.
154. See notes 140-42 supra and accompanying text.
155. See text accompanying note 149 supra.
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Third, even if the SEC took a firm position against reimbursement of
expenses of an unsuccessful defendant, carefully defined, the question
remains whether reimbursement of legal expenses can constitutionally be
denied an unsuccessful litigant. 156 Furthermore, if the Securities and Ex-
change Commission begins acting to strike down indemnification agreements,
more companies will turn to indemnification insurance, which has the
approval of the SEC.1 7
IV. CONCLUSION
The mandatory indemnification statutes of Delaware, and the similar
Model Act provisions in effect in many states, give persons who have
breached their fiduciary duty to the corporation an enforceable right to
indemnification in some instances. The Delaware statute's inflexible standard
of success is inadequate in a situation like that presented in Wolfson.
Corporate management as well as the courts seem to be needlessly restricted
by the Delaware court's treatment of the nolo contendere plea. Where the
executive has pleaded nolo contendere for reasons other than guilt, he has no
recourse if his corporation unjustly refuses to indemnify him. If an undeserv-
ing director or officer negotiates an agreement with the prosecution whereby
some counts are dropped, the corporation will be powerless to prevent the
Wolfson result. The New York indemnification provision is superior to
Delaware's in this respect, in that it allows a corporation to change the
mandatory result by express charter provision. For states whose policy is to
protect the interests of the shareholders of a corporation, the New York and
California statutes seem preferable to that of Delaware. Giving a court
156. See note 140 supra.
157. The Securities and Exchange Commission might intervene to oppose an indemni-
fication agreement. In Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp., 332 F. Supp.
544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), the SEC intervened to oppose a proposal by Leasco to pay ajudgment and plaintiff's legal fees totalling $330,000 without seeking contribution from
the three directors found jointly liable with Leasco under a section of the 1933 Securities
Act for negligently failing to include material information in the registration statement
filed in connection with the exchange offer. The court eventually approved an agreement
whereby each director paid Leasco $5,000 "in satisfaction of any claims that Leasco may
have against said defendants for contribution." Order, Civil No. 69-1329 (E.D.N.Y., July
31, 1972). The SEC could seek an injunction against an indemnification agreement
under its power to obtain injunctive relief against violations of the Securities Acts.
Securities Act of 1933, § 20(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77(t) (1970); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, § 21(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78(u) (1970). However, this possibility seems remote due to
the narrowness of the issue-the definition of success-and the fact that there presently
is no definitive SEC position on the subject. If the mandatory indemnification had been
sought by someone who had agreed to operate under the restrictions of rule 460, the SEC
could oppose indemnification as a matter of breach of agreement, and the agreement to
be interpreted would be the terms of rule 460. If that rule were not involved, the SEC
might seek to enjoin the indemnification merely on the basis of the policy of the Act.
Shareholders of the defendant corporation might intervene in a suit for indemnifica-
tion if they knew about the suit, which is unlikely under the Delaware statute. However,
shareholders may not have standing to raise the issue of the SEC policy. If the
corporation had made indemnification a matter of contract with the officer or director, it
might be estopped from raising the defense. Even if standing were not a problem, the
unclear position of the SEC would make difficult an argument that the policy of the SEC
was being violated.
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discretion to deny or award indemnification based on the underlying circum-
stances of the case, at least when the defense is only partially successful, may
prevent undeserving executives from receiving indemnification as a matter of
statutory right. The strained arguments that the nolo contendere plea is a
settlement, and that the statutory standard of success should be limited by
the word "vindication," would ,be unnecessary if the court had discretion to
look into the circumstances behind the nolo contendere plea both on the
count in which entered and on the counts dropped. Unless prosecutors refuse
to bargain, the Wolfson formula will be very attractive to indicted manage-
ment where Delaware law applies. Because the conflict with securities law is
a refined and narrow conflict, the chance of its litigation by the SEC is
remote at the present time, and the probability of a corporation's successfully
raising the issue is small. Thus, the matter at the present time remains largely
a problem of state corporation law.
APPENDIX
Indemnification Provisions
Model ActState Statute Mandatory Exclusive Type
ALA. CODE tit. 10, § 21(64a) (Supp. 1973) X X
ALAS. STAT. § 10.05.010 (Supp. 1974) X X
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-198(B) (Supp.
1974)
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-309 (Supp. 1973) X X
CAL. CORP. CODE § 830 (West Supp. 1975) X X
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-3-101(o) (1973)
CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 33-320a (1975) X X
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1974) X X
D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-904(p) (1973)
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.13(14) (Supp. 1975) X
GA. CODE ANN. § 22-717 (1970) X X
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 416-26(16) (1968)
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, § 163(a)(4) (Supp.
1975)
IND. ANN. STAT. § 23-1-2-2 (Supp. 1974)
IOWA CODE ANN. § 496A.4(19) (Supp. 1975) X X
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6305 (1974) X X
Ky. REV. STAT. § 271 A.025 (Supp. 1974) X X
LA. REV. STAT. tit. 12, § 83 (1969), as
amended, (West Supp. 1975) X X
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ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 719 (1974) x x
MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 64 (1973) X X
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 67 (1970),
as amended, (Supp. 1974)
MICH. Comp. LAWS § 450.1561-69 (1973) X X
MINN. STAT. § 301.095 (1969) x x
Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-3-7-(o) (1972)
Mo. REV. STAT. § 351.355 (Supp. 1975) X x
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 15-2204 (1967)
NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2004(15) (1974) x x
NEV. REV. STAT. tit. 7, § 78.751 (1973) X x
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 294:4 (Supp. 1973)
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-5 (1969), as amended,
(Supp. 1975) X
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-244(o) (Supp. 1973)
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 721-26 (1963),
as amended, §§ 726-27
(McKinney Supp. 1974) X X
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55.19-.21 (1975) x x
N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19-04(15) (1960)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.13(E) (Page
Supp. 1974) X X
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.43(a)
(Supp. 1974) X X
ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 57.255, 57.260 (1974) X X
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 410, 1410
(Supp. 1975) X X
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 14, § 1202(10) (1962)
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 7-1.1-4.1 (1969), as
amended, § 7-1.1-4.1(h) (Supp. 1974) X x
S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-18.18 (Supp. 1974) x
S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 47-2-58(15)
(1969)
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-406 to -411 (Supp. 1974) X X
TEX. Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. art. 2.02A(16)
(Supp. 1974)
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-4(o) (1973) X x
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-3.1 (Supp. 1975) X x
V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 32(10) (1966)
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.025 (Supp.
1974) x x
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31-1-9 (1975) X x
Wis. STAT. § 180.05 (Supp. 1975) X x
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 17-36.4(o) (1965)
